Th is article is part of the Dossier on Tacitus published in last year's issue of Grotiana . It off ers a combined study of both the content and the language and style of Grotius' account of the capture of Breda in the second book of the Historiae , published in 1657 together with the Annales under the title Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis . A thorough analysis of Grotius' account of this eventful and dramatic turning point in the Dutch revolt reveals that it is nothing but a defective and occasionally unclear rehearsel of the standard narrative of the capture based on the well-known and in Grotius' day widely read history-books written in French and Dutch. Th e rather artifi cial imitation of Tacitus's brevitas on the stylistic level does not suffi ce to qualify Grotius's account as a masterful piece of Tacitean writing, because it does not highlight the motives of the chief characters in the story nor the connection between the events and their eff ects, and because Grotius fails to present his own perspective on this important episode in the war against Spain.
Introduction
In this article, which is part of the Dossier on Tacitus and Grotius published in the previous issue of this journal -Grotiana 29 (2008), 73-149 -, I aim to contribute to the discussion of Grotius's Tacitism in the Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis . Does this work deserve its reputation as an outstanding example of Tacitean historiography? In order to address this question, I will follow J. Waszink's suggestion in the Introduction to the Dossier (p. 75) and off er a combined study of both the content and the language and style of one selected passage from the second part of Grotius's work, the Historiae , in which a famous event in the war against Spain is narrated. After a brief introduction, I will fi rst present a summary of the passage in question (section 1), then discuss its Tacitean characteristics, fi rst from the point of view of the content of the narrative (section 2), then from the point of view of its language and style (section 3). Finally in the conclusion (section 4) I will attempt to formulate a general assessment of the Tacitean quality of our passage.
Th e fame of the Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis as a preeminent example of Tacitean historiography dates from the second half of the seventeenth century and persists in the modern age. Th us, Fueter praised Grotius in 1911 as Tacitus's equal 'in der Kunst der psychologischen Analyse' and as his superior 'in der Diskussion militärischer und politischer Probleme.' Romein 1941 stressed the great distance between the histories of the Dutch Revolt in Bor, Van Meteren and Van Reyd on the one hand and those of the unsurpassed Hooft and Grotius on the other hand (p. 19); according to Romein, the work of Hooft and Grotius constitutes the 'fourth or dramatic' phase of historiography, in which 'the characters have been given stature and character and thereby motives for their actions and decisions' and 'events have their causes and consequences' (p. 21). As to Tacitus, he is a unique Roman historiographer, because he confi nes himself to the essentials of the events he chooses to relate, and in his account of those events he focuses on their causes and eff ects. He recreates single historical occurrences into grandiose scenes, showing particular interest in both the human drama behind events and the hidden motives which direct the running of things. His unparalleled way of presenting historical material is matched by his singular style of writing, featuring short sentences with frequent ellipses and omission of connecting conjunctions, longer periods characterized by participles and ablatives instead of subordinate clauses, deliberate syntactical irregularities, poetic and archaic diction, and the frequent use of sententiae throughout. Like all Roman historians, Tacitus seeks to moralize by presenting examples of good and bad behavior, but his mood is uniquely pessimistic. In Grotius's time, it was expected that historiography did justice to the value of history as, to use Daniel Heinsius's words, 'mother of the truth, guide to the lives of people, true instigator of our actions, the "capital" of political wisdom', for, among other things, 'history teaches better than philosophy what it means to be moderate and noble, and what are the tasks of a judge, a member of a governing council and a commander at war'. In his article published in the previous issue of this journal (29, 2008, p. 88-90), J. Waszink has cited in detail some passages from three contemporaries of Grotius to illustrate why it was Tacitus whose work counted as the supreme model for historiography: Lipsius focuses most on the content, and then briefl y counters the objections against Tacitus's style; Daniel Heinsius also stresses the qualities of the content of Tacitus's work and continues with the observation that its style matches its content; fi nally, Vossius praises Tacitus's style, but judges his prudence more praiseworthy. 1 In order to assess the alleged Tacitean quality of Grotius's writing, I have chosen a passage at the beginning of book 2 of the Historiae , in which Grotius relates a famous episode which occurred at the end of February and the beginning of March 1590 in the war against Spain. In those days, the Dutch army, under Stadtholder Maurice, count of Nassau (1567-1625), used a stratagem to conquer the important fortress of Breda, which had been in Spanish hands since 1581. On the peatbarge of the Van Bergens, a family of skippers in Leur, not far west of Breda, well over 70 soldiers with their offi cers, led by Charles de Héraugière, captain in the army, were hidden under the deck, which was loaded with peat that was to be delivered in the fortress.
Th e capture of Breda was the fi rst in a series of victories of Stadtholder Maurice, which eventually forced the Spanish troops to leave the territory of the Seven United Provinces constituting the Dutch Republic. It was already in its own time a legendary act of heroism that was widely boasted of as a modern counterpart of the capture of Troy by means of the wooden horse. Th e capture of Breda appealed to the imagination of people both in the Dutch Republic and abroad. Th e fi rst accounts of it were published practically instantaneously after the event in two pamphlets, one in German and one in French. 2 In 1606, the story of the capture of Breda was dramatized by Jacob Duym. 3 In this play the parallel between the peatbarge and the wooden horse fi gures prominently. Duym underlines two points of comparison (both the wooden horse and the peatbarge were fi lled with armed men, and both were hauled in by their later victims themselves), then stresses that the wooden horse brought ruin upon Troy, while Breda was liberated. 4 Th e capture of Breda was naturally also treated in more or less detail by the fi rst history-writers to present a continuous narrative of the Dutch revolt, Jean François le Petit, 5 Emanuel van Meteren 6 , Everhart van Reyd, 7 and Pieter Bor. 8 Grotius read these and many not have used this work for the fi rst version of his work from 1612; the year 1590 is not covered in Bor's works published before 1612. 9 'Prematur itaque immaturus labor, donec aetas cum iudicio tempus quoque emendandi dederit, aut potius exsurgat alius, qui res scitu per se non indignas dictione commendet, ut eo libentius discant posteri, quid Batavi fecerint', Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius , ed. other works on the fi rst period of the 80-years' war and the capture of Breda during the long period in which he was working on his own history of the Dutch revolt against the Spanish rule.
It is useful to briefl y recall the genesis of the Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis . As early as November 1601 the States of Holland, following the suggestion of their leader, the Advocate of Holland Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, resolved to award the then 18-year old Grotius a grant to produce a trial run of a contemporary history of the Republic. By January 1603, Grotius had progressed so far that he was awarded a second grant for its completion. In 1604 he became the offi cial historian of Holland, as successor of Janus Dousa, who died in that year. After he had been appointed 'Advocaat-Fiscaal' (public prosecutor for the States of Holland) in 1607, Grotius became so occupied that he had little time left for historiography. Afterwards, his concern for the religious diff erences in the Republic may have reduced his enthusiasm for historiographical writing. Th us, it was only in 1612 that Grotius had his work delivered by van Oldenbarnevelt to the 'Gecommitteerde Raden', the executive body of the States of Holland. Th ese men placed the manuscript in the hands of a committee, which came to the conclusion that it was not opportune to publish it.
Whatever the reason for this judgement may have been, Grotius himself admitted to J.A. de Th ou that he found his work immature and that it should remain unpublished until it could be made better at the proper time thanks to age and good judgement. 9 In the remaining years of his lifetime, both in the Netherlands and after 1621 as a fugitive in France, he continued to read books 10 I have also consulted the seventeenth-century translations in French (1662), English (1665) and Dutch (1681); see for the titles of these translations the introductory note to the Appendix, below, p. 244 .
11 Th e manuscript is in the University Library of Leiden, ms. Papenbroeck 9.1; the story of the capture of Breda, at the beginning of book 2 of the Historiae , comprises fols. 17 recto -19 verso, with one addition written separately on fol. 18 recto, for which see below, note 51. Th e title of book 2 underwent three changes; it was fi rst: 'Hugonis Grotii commentariorum de rebus Belgicis liber quartus', commentarii being the original title of the whole work. 'Commentariorum' was crossed out and replaced by 'historiarum'; 'quartus' was crossed out and replaced fi rst by 'septimus', then by 'secundus' (cf. Ridderikhoff , 'Een aristocratische geschiedenis', as in n. 7, p. 283. It should be noted that the manuscript does not contain any indication that the entire work had the title 'Annales' at any moment).
12 Boot, 'Hugo Grotius et Cornelius Tacitus' (as in n. 9), p. 355: 'In rebus gestis narrandis et in institutis describendis quantus artifex fuerit (sc. Grotius), plura exempla ostendunt, maxime in Historiarum libris. Ut pauca nominem … quaeque de Breda dolo capta. ' and unpublished sources on the revolt of the Dutch against Spain, and he kept revising the text of the manuscript which had been declined for publication. Eventually, the entire work was published posthumously in 1657 by Grotius's sons Cornelius and Petrus, twelve years after the author's death.
I have taken as my starting point the Latin text which has been made public property through this printed edition.
10 Th e only extant manuscript of the story of the capture of Breda in 1590, the beginning of book 2 of the Historiae , is a fair autograph copy of -apparently -the version of 1612 with some additions (most of them in the margin) and a few corrections in the text. Where it seems relevant in the context of my argument, I have mentioned in the notes when a passage constitutes an addition in the manuscript. All additions in the manuscript are printed in italics in the Appendix.
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Th e title Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis , which Grotius gave to his work well after his escape from Loevestein Castle, calls to mind Tacitus's two main works Annales and Historiae , and thus manifestly advertises it as a Tacitean historiographical work. Assuming Grotius aspired to write after the fashion of Tacitus, one may expect that the important and dramatic episode of the capture of Breda constituted an outstanding opportunity for him to show his ability to distinguish himself from earlier history-writers as a narrator of great events. It is with this expectation that I approached Grotius's account of the capture of Breda, encouraged by Boot's praise of this narrative in his study of Grotius's Tacitism. 12 To verify my supposition, I have not confi ned myself to looking at Grotius's style and diction (as Boot has in his study 'Hugo Grotius et Cornelius Tacitus'), but I have also, in accordance with Norma Miller's study on the inseparable unity of style and content in Tacitus (see note  88 14 Grotius has read some of these foreign works.
15

Summary of Grotius's narrative
Before addressing our main question, I will give a synopsis of Grotius's story of the surprise of Breda. Th e sections and line numbers in this synopsis refer to the text edition in the Appendix. Th e synopsis will include some notes, in which I will refer to the published sources on the capture of Breda mentioned above, in order to provide some additional information or explanations where Grotius's account makes this desirable or necessary. Th ese notes should not be understood as a contribution to the study of Grotius's use of his sources. For a modern account of the capture of Breda based on the published sources and on additional archival research, I refer the reader to the studies of Van der Hoeven 16 and Wijnbeek, 17 which I have used throughout as a point of reference. For the benefi t of the reader, I have occasionally added between brackets clarifi cations which are lacking in Grotius's text.
Sections 1 and 2 (lines 1-18). Introductory remarks
In section 1, Grotius provides geographical and historical information on the town of Breda and its rulers. He explains that Breda is situated near the frontier with Holland, in the (Western) part of (Dutch Noord-) Brabant where the river Aa (coming from the south) becomes broader and changes its name into Mark (of which it is an affl uent); after running along the fortress of Breda, the river (Mark) fl ows into the sea-bay (then reaching far inland) near the town of Zevenbergen. 18 He briefl y recalls that the house of Polanen bought Breda under the title of barony, and that the house of Nassau became its owner through Engelbrecht's marriage, 19 stressing that his great grandson Henry 20 had fortifi ed the city with walls, moats and a fortress (adjacent to the north of the city), and that the present conduct of war had caused new ramparts to be added and had given the city its reputation of being hard to conquer. In section 2, Grotius turns to the description of the stratagem. He ascribes the invention of it to a skipper ('nauta', line 9) and mentions that captain Charles de Héraugière, from Cambray, discussed the plan with prince Maurice and undertook the execution of it, taking Lambert Charles as his associate. For the execution of the plan, a peatbarge was chosen which had a permit to transport regularly fuel to Breda. Grotius continues with a brief description of the nature of turf. 18 Apparently Grotius felt the need, after 1612, to add in the manuscript, for the benefi t of the reader who was unfamiliar with the geography of the region: 'ad confi nium Hollandiae' (line 2) and 'et mox ad Septembergas oppidum in maris sinum se immergit' (lines 4-5); however, these specifi cations will not have been very useful for the foreign reader, for whom a Latin edition was meant specifi cally. 19 Engelbrecht I of Nassau (1370-1443) married Johanna of Polanen (1392-1445) in 1403. 20 Henry III of Nassau (1483-1538). 21 Most sources mention 70 men and/or specify 68 soldiers and 4 offi cers; only the German pamphlet of 1590 mentions sixty-fi ve participants; Hallema (n. 2), p. 118 (the number is mentioned twice, once in the title and once in the text).
Section 3 (lines 19-26). Th e journey to Breda
22 'Tenui interjectu', line 20, means 'with a thin partition in between'; this can only refer to the wooden partition behind which the soldiers were hidden in the hold of the barge, invisible from the cabin, as mentioned by the French pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 123, Le Petit (n. 5), p. 579 col. b and Bor (n. 8), fol. 22 verso col. b. See also Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 36. Only the German pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 118) and both editions of Van Meteren (n. 6) mention that an extra ceiling was built in the hold; however, this is very unlikely because thean attempt to produce a sententia , that the beginnings of the mission were diffi cult ('ut solent ejusmodi conatus malis onerari', line 21): the departure of the barge had to be postponed because of a strong head wind ('adversa vis venti', line 22), fi erce cold ('asperum frigus', line 22) and soon, due to the delay, shortage of food ('defectus ciborum', line 22). He then continues with the observation that the journey was resumed (up the river Mark) not far from Breda ('haud procul Breda', line 26), after the men had recovered and Héraugière had heartened them with a speech ('ubi refoverant corpora et animos Heraugerius sermone fi rmavit', line 24), 24 and after a messenger was sent to Maurice, who was hiding his army on a nearby island ('proximam apud insulam', line 26). 25 
Section 4 (lines 27-36). Arrival within the boundaries of the fortress
After the barge had passed the sluice ('aquae septum' 26 ) located not too far from the fortress ('quod arcem propter est', line 27), the point from which it February 26, in the evening: Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 66; Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 31. 24 In accordance with the French pamphlet (Hallema (n.2)), Van Meteren (n. 5), Le Petit (n. 6) and Bor (n. 8), Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 66, states that the delay lasted from Monday night until Th ursday March 1 early in the morning; the men then disembarked at a certain distance from the starting point, went back to the fortress Noortdam, near Zevenbergen, at some point on Th ursday, recovered there and went back to the barge to resume the journey on Th ursday evening. Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 31-32, has interpreted the sources somewhat diff erently and concluded that the soldiers disembarked on Th ursday evening instead of early in the morning before daylight, and resumed the journey only on Friday evening March 2. 25 Maurice had moved his army to Willemstad (Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 65; Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 28). In Grotius's time, the town of Willemstad stood on an island. It seems however more likely that Maurice had secretly moved from Willemstad closer to Breda on one or several of the small islands by the mouth of the river Mark near Zevenbergen; in the text immediately following our section 8, Grotius mentions that Maurice's troops had occupied these islands. Moreover, in the manuscript Grotius had fi rst written 'proximas apud insulas', and this cannot refer to Willemstad. Finally 154) ). Grotius did not realize or, if he did, he did not care, that by using the phrase 'intra aquae septum … pervectos' (after having passed the sluice), he introduced something factually impossible into his account, because in what follows he still situates the barge in the river with its change of the tides ('fl uminis recessu', line 28; 'aestu levata', line 30), although it was the function of the sluice to close off the tides from the moat around the fortress. From the French pamphlet, both editions of Van Meteren, Le Petit and Bor we know that the events related in section 4 happened after the ship had passed the last boom (in the river), and at any rate before it passed the sluice in the moat of the fortress; see also Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 67 and Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 35-36. 27 During the hour the barge had to wait between the boom and the sluice, it ran aground and sprung a leak. Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 35, says the barge arrived at the last boom 'by 2 p.m.' Only in both editions of Van Meteren (n. 6), Latin version, p. 515 (erroneously 516); Dutch version, fol. 271 verso col. b, there is also mention of the ice as the cause of a leak, but this is only mentioned much later on in the story, after the real leaking had long stopped, when the skipper, who at night was in the fortress, was asked why he made so much noise with pumping, and answered that the ice had caused a leak. Th e French pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 125) and Le Petit (n. 5, p. 581 col. a) also mention this later occurrence, but in their version, the skipper mentions as the reason 'la vieillesse du bateau'. Th us, Grotius has derived the phrase 'sive glacies pertudit' (l. 28), with which he deviates from his sources, from an invented excuse by the skipper in Van Meteren's story. Just as the mistake with the sluice (see above, note 26), this shows his lack of understanding of the things he is writing about; cf. also notes 28, 32, 41, 43 and 45. 28 With the fanciful statement that the leak closed by itself when the tide rose, Grotius perhaps follows Van Meteren (n. 6), who writes: '… dan also het water ofte vloet wies / soo ist leck weder van selfs miraculeuselic gestopt' (Dutch version, fol. 271 verso col. b). In fact, what happened was not so miraculous, for Van Meteren himself states in the same passage that the barge grounded in the river during the low tide and heeled over, until it became afl oat again during high tide and stopped making water. Th e detailed and well-informed French pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 124) and, in its wake, Le Petit (n. 5), p. 580 col. a, also mention that the barge, while it was lying motionless, waiting for the sluice to open, was grounded by the eb and made water (not 'sprung a leak') until the tide rose and it stopped heeling over.
was not possible to return ('unde regressus non erat', line 27), a new disaster ('nova calamitas', lines 27-28) threatens the men: the barge makes water either running aground because of the low tide or because it is pierced by ice.
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Grotius briefl y mentions three facts which illustrate that the situation was very dangerous. First, the men were trapped in their hiding place, knee-deep in water, until the barge, lifted up by the tide, ceased by itself to take in water: '… donec aestu levata navis nulla humana ope perfl uere ultro desiit' (line 30). 28 Secondly, the garrison commanders had kept on shifting the inspection of ships to ever lower ranks ('ad minora quisque offi cia relegaverant', lines 31-32), more for the sake of maintaining the discipline than out of a feeling that it was a necessity ('quasi ex usu magis disciplinae quam quod necesse arbitrarentur', lines 30-31). Th e serviceman who by this passivity of many was in the end charged with the actual inspection, careless after the example of his superiors, confi ned himself to a superfi cial inspection of the stern of the ship (with the cabin; 'puppe', line 33). Th irdly, Grotius mentions the extraordinary 29 According to Van Meteren (n. 6), Van Reyd (n. 7), and Bor (n. 8), it was lieutenant Mathijs Helt who, when he was overcome by coughing, made this remarkable statement. However, Van Reyd mentions this episode later on, in a diff erent context: see p. 232 with note 74 and cf. below, note 37. For Helt, see also note 59. 30 According to Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16) , p. 67, this action took place on Saturday March 3 at 3 p.m., after the rise of the tide has made it possible to open the sluice of the fortress. Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 39, says that the sluice was opened shortly after three o'clock. Th e sluice about which Van der Hoeven and Wijnbeek speak here was mentioned by Grotius earlier on, at the point where he should have mentioned the last boom in the river (section 4, line 27). 31 Grotius mentions wrongly, in section 4, the incident of the leak after the passing of the sluice instead of before the sluice was opened (see above, note 26). With the exception of the German pamphlet and Van Reyd, who are very concise, all sources mention that, when the barge sprung a leak while waiting before the sluice (line 29) and the ice-cold water reached the soldiers' knees, they were struck by fear of drowning in the dark hold. However, unlike Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 67 and Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), pp. 37-38, they do not mention the rebellious unrest among the soldiers and Héraugière's speech aimed at appeasing them, described by Grotius in section 5 (lines 39-43), as a result of the grounding of the barge and its leaking, but rather as a separate event. Van Meteren situates this on Th ursday, in the fortress of Noortdam, after the soldiers had waited from Monday evening until Th ursday morning in the dark hold of the unmoving barge, in the middle of enemy territory, suff ering from cold and hunger, and fi nally started to make complaints. Th e French pamphlet as well as Le Petit and Bor, who follow it, state that the soldiers' unrest took place 'during the stay of the soldiers in the barge', and mention besides complaints also the reproach which Grotius refers to in line 39. In their account of the surprise of Breda this event is inserted after coincidence ('quod vix alias', lines 33-34) that the cold prompted none of the soldiers to cough at the very moment of the inspection. In this context, he also records that one of the men in complete self-eff acement uttered the wish to be killed for fear that his cough might jeopardize his fellow-soldiers: 'Occidite me … commilitones, ne occidamur.' 29 (lines 35-36)
Section 5 (lines 37-43). Arrival within the moat
Th e garrison soldiers hauled the barge towards the fortress, because the ice hindered it in its movement. 30 Another misfortune ('incommoda', line 38) now occurs: the approaching danger inspires fear in the soldiers and they turn against their commander Charles de Héraugière. Some soldiers demanded to be let out of their dark hiding place, preferring to die in the open air, fi ghting their enemy, lest they be overpowered in their "prison" and be executed. More of them ('plures', line 42) were totally benumbed, and their will to persevere was inspired by despair rather than by their leader's encouragement to show spirit and achieve glory ('ducis hortamenta ad virtutem et gloriam', line 42).
their report on the inspection of the barge, while it lay waiting for the opening of the sluice on Saturday. All sources mention a speech of Héraugière in reaction to the complaints. It is unclear when all this took exactly place, but certainly not after the barge passed the sluice, as Grotius states in lines 37-38, when the time for protest was long over. Likewise, the demands of some soldiers ('poscere', line 41) seem to be Grotius's invention (see below, p. 230-231), to which Héraugière's answer in line 42 ('ducis … gloriam') does not seem to constitute a convincing reaction. See on his diff erent speeches below, note 36 and p. 233 with note 75. 32 Unlike almost all of his sources Grotius speaks throughout the narrative of only one skipper without even mentioning the name of Adriaen van Bergen. In fact there were three or four; their names are not known with certainty, but Adriaen is the most prominent of them; see Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), pp. 19-20 and 62. Grotius clearly did not understand how important it was for the success of the venture that Maurice could be informed at an early stage by one of the skippers that the barge with the soldiers had entered the fortress unnoticed, thereby allowing Maurice to order Hohenlohe to be present shortly after the attack during the night. See below, note 43 and p. 234-235. 33 Only Van Meteren (n. 6) mentions that the skipper pretended tiredness; see also p. 231 with note 73. Th e phrase 'cui et vox … praeferebant' (line 45), which has been added in the margin of the manuscript, seems to have been inspired by Van Reyd; see below, note 74. 34 Grotius and all the other historical sources are silent about where the partial unloading of the ship took place; it is in fact unknown where precisely the soldiers got into the fortress (Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 39). 35 Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 45, mentions that some sources state that is was midnight, while others say it was 11 p.m.; Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 71, says the moon rose at midnight. Whatever the exact time may have been, the soldiers had waited 8 or 9 hours (from ca. 3 p.m. until 11 or 12 p.m.) in their hiding place after the barge had passed the sluice; they spent all this time with their feet in bilgewater and surrounded by the noise of the pump. 36 Grotius means the death penalty for deserters; see below, note 49. Most sources mention a speech of admonition to the soldiers by Héraugière immediately before the disembarkment and the actual attack in order to inspire them with courage, and therefore without the psychologically inappropriate threat at the end, inappropriate even though the men were mercenaries. Besides this exhortation, the sources mention only one other speech of Héraugière, namely the speech in reaction to the unrest among the soldiers (see above, note 31), which Van Meteren situates on
Section 6 (lines 44-60). Th e defeat of the garrison force
Part of the turf is unloaded, but the skipper, 32 who, for his part, was persistently alert, cleverly pretended tiredness ('solertia nautae lassitudinem simulantis', line 44-45) 33 , and so prevented the barge from being discharged completely (by the unloaders). 34 It was decided around midnight to let the men out of their hiding place, when the moon had risen ('media fere nox erat nec illunis', lines 45-46), 35 after an admonition in which the prospect of glory and spoils was held out to them, but that those who would run away from the fi ght would not even be granted an honourable death ('admonitos … dari', lines 46-47).
36 Th e noise of the disembarking soldiers was drowned by the Th ursday in the fortress of Noortdam (see above, note 24), after the frustrating delay at the beginning of the journey, but without a threat at the end; the French pamphlet, Le Petit and Bor mention the speech after their report on the inspection of the barge while it waited for the sluice to open, with the threat at the end, which Grotius situates immediately before the attack. Th e threat at the end of Héraugière's speech is appropriate to the insubordination which found its expression in the complaints of the soldiers, but does not fi t the context where Grotius mentions it in line 47. Without any reason and in an unsatisfactory way the various elements of the speech which are mentioned by the sources were divided by Grotius over three points in time (cf. p. 232): in lines 24-25 during the interruption of the journey (see above, note 24); in line 42 as an inadequate reaction to the rebellious mood of the soldiers, where a threat with death by hanging would have been appropriate (see above, note 31), and here in lines 46-47 immediately before the attack, where only an encouragement is fi tting. From this speech, Grotius has left out a particularly Tacitean element, namely the fact that Héraugière brings to the fore his own motivation as an example: see below, p. 233 with note 75. 37 Grotius does not mention that the pumping of bilgewater had started earlier, as soon as the barge had sprung a leak after its passing of the last boom. In that passage ( section 4 ), Grotius mentions only that at some point, by miracle, the barge stopped making water (line 30), not that it contained much bilgewater which had to be pumped out. See above, p. 216 and note 28.
38 Th e addition to the 'porta' in line 49 'qua in oppidum itur' has been added by Grotius in the margin of the manuscript at a later time, apparently in a vain eff ort to remove the unclarity about the gates: see below, notes 42 and 45-46. 39 'Leuca' is a celtic word, used to indicate the distance of 1500 'passus' (Isidorus, Origines 15, 16, 3). Th e 'passus' or Roman pace indicates the distance of two steps or 1,5 meters, hence one 'leuca' = 1500 'passus' equals 2.250 kilometers. Th us, Grotius states that the distance between Breda and Geertruidenberg was about seven kilometers. In reality, it is more than twelve kilometers in a straight line. Th e cause of this mistake is unclear. In the manuscript, 'tres leucas distantis' is a later addition. pumping of bilgewater; 37 thus, they succeeded in remaining completely unnoticed by the fortress-garrison.
Grotius then briefl y sketches the ensuing military operation: the soldiers were divided into two groups; the fi rst group, led by Héraugière, went to attack the guards of the gate of the fortress which led to the city; 38 these guards were all killed in the guardhouse ('intra stationem', line 50); only one guard, an ensign, dashed out of the guardhouse and, wounding Héraugière with his rapier ('mucro', line 51), bravely met his death. Th e second group, led by Lambert Charles, chased off the garrison soldiers (to the building) in the inner part of the fortress ('in arcis intima', line 52), which the commander of the garrison, Paolo Antonio Lanzavechia, retained as his last hope ('aedes in spem novissimam retinebat', lines 52-53). Paolo had temporarily taken over the command of the city from his father, Odoardo, who, being also garrison commander of Geertruidenberg, three leucae 39 (to the north) of Breda, had left to that city to strengthen it because he had been led to believe that Maurice was 40 Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 68, and Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), pp. 27-28 mention that Odoardo had taken a part of the garrison force with him, leaving only about 50 soldiers (not including the offi cers) with his son to defend the fortress of Breda. Whether this is true or not, Odoardo undoubtedly did not ride by himself to Geertruidenberg and one may gather from the various sources that not many more than about sixty men, including the offi cers, were present in the fortress. Th is fi gure corresponds roughly with the number of Italian casualties (37) which Wijnbeek, p. 53, mentions on the basis of a bill of the gravedigger, provided the 'many dead' among the 36 men of Lanzavechia mentioned on p. 47, who were permitted to withdraw unopposed, were about ten men. 41 It is highly unlikely that it were the citizens of Breda who attempted to break into the fortress, all the more since Grotius also mentions that they were frightened ('pavida civitas', line 67). Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 70, and Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 47, say that the soldiers of the Italian city-garrison attacked the fortress in an eff ort to support Lanzavechia. Grotius has misinterpreted his sources which do not explicitly say that it were soldiers , e.g. Van Meteren (n. 6), Dutch version, fol. 272 recto col. a: 'Den allarm ontstack oock inde stadt / so dat eenighe begonnen t'vyer aende poorten des casteels te steken…' Only the German pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 119) says that 'die Bürger', when they realized that there was a fi ght in the fortress (cf. below, note 59), gathered together with the garrison to retake the fortress, and all the sources except Van Reyd mention that the citizens for fear of plundering encouraged the Italians in vain to defend the city. 42 Of all the sources only the Dutch version of Van Meteren (see above, note 41) does not clearly have the singular of 'gate', although 'poorten' in this sentence does not necessarily have to be taken as a plural. Nevertheless, in spite of the clarifi cation added to 'porta' in line 49 (see above, note 38), the plural 'portas' in line 61 is again one of Grotius's misinformations, because the fortress of Breda had only one (southerly) gate giving access to the city; there was a second, northerly gate (the 'veldpoort'), which lead to a wood (the 'Belcromsche bos'); see Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), pp. 61 and 63. In lines 49 and 64, Grotius rightly uses the singular ('portam'), but in line 66 we fi nd another incorrect plural ('portas'): cf. below, notes 45-46.
preparing to gather troops (for an attack) there. 40 Grotius stresses that it was a serious mistake ('nec levis error', line 56) of the duke of Parma (then governor of the Netherlands on behalf of the Spanish king Philip II) to assign the command of two fortifi ed towns to one person. Nevertheless, Paolo made a sortie and attacked his enemy. Grotius eloquently evokes the fi ght between the men and its inevitable outcome in this sententia : 'vicere quibus vinci non licebat multaque caede saucius ipse (sc. Paulus Lanzavechia), qua venerat, refugit' (lines 58-59).
Section 7 (lines 61-76). Arrival of Maurice with his army
Th e noise of the fi ghting was heard in the city and the inhabitants ('oppidani', line 61) 41 would have burst into the fortress through its gates ('portas arcis' line 61) 42 , had not Héraugière prevented their attack with bullets ('glandibus', 43 In fact it was Maurice who received a message and then ordered Hohenlohe to advance to Breda with the vanguard cavalry of the troops after he had been informed by one of the skippers (as told by Van Meteren, Van Reyd and Bor, see above, note 32) that the barge had entered the fortress and that the actual attack was to take place later during the night. According to all sources (except the succinct German pamphlet), the skipper in question had been ordered to leave the barge and spend the night in the city, and it was only thanks to carnival that he had succeeded to leave the city unnoticed along with the local countrymen who were going home after they had been feasting in the city (see below, p. 226 with note 59). Th is happened after the partial unloading of the barge. See Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 42, and cf. Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 69. Grotius suppressed this crucial information from his sources and confi ned himself to what only Van Meteren (n. 6) mentions after the fortress had been overpowered, Dutch version, fol. 272 recto col. a: 'de besproken teeckenen gedaen (zijnde)' to alert Hohenlohe. Grotius's reader is left with the question how and how fast Hohenlohe could be alerted from within the fortress; see also pp. 234-235; Maurice was at about fi fteen kilometers in a straight line from Breda (see above, note 25) . 44 Most sources mention that Hohenlohe arrived two hours after the garrison of the fortress had stopped all resistance. 45 In his fi rst version, Grotius did not mention (or perhaps did not even realise himself ) that the 'porta' mentioned in line 64 is not the same gateway as the 'porta' mentioned in line 49 (see note 38) and, incorrectly in the plural, in lines 61 and 66. Maurice did not enter through the palisade, but through the northerly gate (the 'veldpoort'); Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 71. Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 47. See also above, note 42 for the two gates of the fortress. 46 Th e reader has to understand, without being told so by the author, that the 'gates' of line 66 are in fact the one southerly gate, leading from the fortress into the city, not the northern 'veldpoort' mentioned two lines earlier; see also above, note 42. It must be said, however, that Grotius here may have been misled by his sources: all, except Van Reyd, state that Maurice, having arrived in the fortress but still unaware of the fl ight of the city-garrison, prepared to attack the city through two gates; the French pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 127), Le Petit (n. 5), p. 582 col. a, and Bor (n. 8), fol. 24 recto col. a, mention here oddly enough 'the two gates' which led from the fortress into the city. 47 In those days a victorious army had the right to plunder the town or city it had conquered by storm. line 62). Finally ('tandem', line 62), after he had received a message that the surprise attack had succeeded ('accepto rei bene gestae signo', lines 62-63), the count of Hohenlohe 43 was present with a part of Maurice's army which was waiting near by.
44 Th e troops passed through (a gap made in) the palisade ('septum e palis', line 64), because the (northern) gate (of the fortress) ('portam', line 64) 45 was frozen up. Th en Lanzavechia did no longer delay to surrender, stipulating the preservation of his life. Before long, the prince arrived with his army; he threatened to burst into the city from within the fortress with his infantry and cavalry ('pedes turmaeque per arcis portas impressionem minabantur', line 66).
46 Th e inhabitants bought off the pillaging of their city with two months pay (per soldier).
47 Th e Italian troops charged with the 48 In the version of 1612, the manuscript did not contain the details on the number of soldiers in the city-garrison and what their task was ('erant hi … tenere portas', lines 68-69), while instead of the phrase 'exterriti … consenserant' in lines 70-71 Grotius had written only 'vecordes profugerant'. While all sources on the Dutch side, except Van Reyd and even the German pamphlet mention the strength of the garrison, they do not mention the disagreement among them (line 70), but several Spanish and Italian historians do indeed report their dissension (Vosters, 'Oude Spaanse en Italiaanse geschiedschrijvers', as in n. 14, pp. 119-123). 49 It was customary that soldiers who deserted were put to death by hanging. However, the sources from the Dutch side mention only the public beheading of all the offi cers or only the three who were in command, and of the corporal who inspected the barge carelessly; see for the punishment according to Paolo Rinaldi and other Spanish and Italian authors Vosters, 'Oude Spaanse en Italiaanse geschiedschrijvers', as in n. 14, pp. 129-131. Th e remarkable phrase on the sparing of the unknown, young Intemel's life (line 74-75) -while Grotius does not even mention Mathias Helt's name (see above, note 29) or the name of Adriaen van Bergen (see above, note 32) -was added in the margin of the manuscript at some later time, together with the following sentence on Odoardo Lanzavechia. In accordance with Rinaldi and several other Spanish and Italian authors, Bor (n.8, fol. 24 verso col. a) mentions that Parma pardoned a Francesco Ventimiglia, but he does not mention Intemel. With the three later additions in the passage on the fl ight of the city garrison mentioned in this and the previous note, Grotius appears to have tried to bring into his narrative some Tacitean depth concerning the causes of a crucial event and the consequences for the main characters in it, but it all remains rather vague. Cf. also above, note 48 and below, p. 235 with note 78.
50 Th e soldiers did not put their names on the list themselves, as Grotius seems to suggest, but captains came to the fore with the number of their troops and were put on the list through the intercession of Hohenlohe; see Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 72. Perhaps Grotius aimed to protect both Maurice and Hohenlohe by shifting all responsibility to the soldiers. Cf. also below, p. 231 with note 72.
defence of the city -six hundred foot soldiers and thirty cavalry, men who had behaved themselves outrageously while billeted in the town -had been in mutual discord for some time ('iampridem', line 70) and fl ed in fear. 48 Afterwards, Parma punished them (by death) for their desertion, with the exception of the young nobleman Intemel. 49 Odoardo Lanzavechia abdicated his command of Geertruidenberg, as if to punish himself.
Section 8 (lines 77-90). Entry of Maurice in the city of Breda, ransom to prevent the pillaging of the city, thanksgiving of the States
Maurice entered the city of his ancestors victoriously and took the inhabitants under his protection and authority ('accepit in fi dem et ditionem', line 77). Although the sum to buy off the plundering of the city amounted to 100.000 guilders because many more soldiers gave their names (as rightful claimants) than there had been present (at the actual fi ght), 50 Maurice pitied (the city for this) more than he accused (the soldiers) ('civitatem … dolens magis quam 51 Here, I follow the French translation of 1662 (see above, note 10): 'il ayma mieux plaindre les uns qu'accuser les autres'. Since a ransom to prevent pillaging was enforced, the French translator apparently -and in my view correctly -thought it inconceivable that reproaches or accusations were formulated against the civilian administrators of a conquered city. Th e entire phrase in lines 78-81 ('pressam … pependisset. Tum') has been added in the manuscript on the page facing fol. 17 verso, fol. 18 recto, with an insertion mark added in the text on fol. 17 verso. On fol. 18 recto there is also written a second, smaller addition to the text that follows our section 8. For the rest, fol. 18 has remained blank. It seems to me, however, that these two insertions do not date from the period after 1612, but are part of the version of 1612, and were fi rst overlooked when the draft was being copied, or were added as an afterthought. Research of the manuscript might provide a decisive answer concerning this question. Cf. also below, note 67. 52 Th is whole passage appears to be based on Van Reyd (n. 7), who, being a servant of the Frisian Stadtholder Willem Lodewijk, speaks regularly with frankness about this kind of subject matter, especially in relation to Maurice: 'Maer alle dage quamender meer ende meer / als oft sy mede totten aenslach 'teen of 'tander gedaen hadden / ende daerom op 't Register van die gene / die de twee maenden [Grotius, line 67] genieten souden / behoorden ghestelt te zijn / voor de welcke de Grave van Hohenlo met eenige andere Hoofden alleen op des Krijghsvolcx gunst siende / spraecken / ende niemants voor die bedroefde Borgherij. Hebbende Graef Maurits doen ter tijd / om de jonge Jaren / niet aensiens genoech / d'andere oude Oversten tegen te spreecken / ende daerom niet anders konnende / dan zijne schamele Onderdanen met suchten beklagen.' (p. 289, lines 6-14) After these words, Van Reyd observes that a sack of the city, which had already been heavily affl icted by the Spanish sack of 1581 (Grotius, line 87) and by the billeting of a great city garrison (cf. also Grotius, lines 71-72), would almost have been better than the ransom of 100.000 guilders, and that Parma is reported to have said that he deserved praise for his clemency towards Antwerp in 1585, which had to pay only 400.000 guilders, while Breda equalled not even one twentieth of that city. Van Reyd does not make the soldiers entirely responsible for the draconic ransom, as does Grotius (see above, note 50).
53 Th e aim of such hostile and predatory incursions was to plunder, to seize provisions and to deprive Parma's army commander Mansfeld of the support given to him by the Roman Catholic accusans (sc. milites)', line 79) 51 , out of youthful modesty and the desire to avoid giving the impression of being driven by self-interest. Grotius adds by way of comparison that Antwerp paid to Parma not more than 400.000 guilders to prevent a sack. 52 Héraugière was appointed governor of Breda, the other offi cers received honors and rewards. Th e States (General) promulgated a thanksgiving-day (in all the United Provinces), decreed public celebrations of joy and issued a commemorative medal. Ingenious people commended the leadership of the prince and the (for a military man) not unworthy ruse ('auspicia principis et non degenerem dolum', lines 84-85) by comparing it with the capture of Troy. People compared the surprise-attack to what had happened nine years earlier, when the Spanish invaded Breda thanks to the absence of the garrison and the treason of the gatekeepers, and thereupon caused a massacre among the citizens. Several companies of foot soldiers were left behind to protect the city, as well as cavalerymen to carry out raids into the villages of Brabant; 53 the rest of Maurice's army left. Th e supplies which had people inhabiting the countryside. It should be remembered here that Brabant, which did not form part of the Republic, was considered to be enemy-country. Grotius says that when the capture of Breda was reported to Parma, who was staying in Germany, he sent Mansfeld from the city of Rheinberg to Brabant, 'ne agros impune raptari pateretur' (lest he should permit the countryside to be ravaged with impunity) (ed. 1658, p. 143). 54 Namely the Advocate van Oldenbarnevelt and Johan Pauli, member of the Council of State, which was responsible for the supply of the army; see Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 65; Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), pp. 25-26. 55 Th e works of Van Meteren (for the fi rst edn 1599: see notes 6 and 65) and Le Petit (1601; see above, note 5), the manuscript of Van Reyd (1605; see above, note 7); possibly also the two pamphlets from 1590 and 1591 mentioned above, in note 2. 56 After submitting his fi rst version in 1612, he must have seen Bor (1626; see above, note 8) and he may also have read Baudart (1616, see above, note 16); he certainly consulted the printed edition of Van Reyd (1626; see Tuynman, 'An unknown letter' (as in n. 7), p. 24 with note 7) and some of the Spanish and Italin works studied by Vosters, 'Oude Spaanse en Italiaanse geschiedschrijvers' (as in n. 14): see above, note 15. been gathered by those who had been privy to Maurice's military operation 54 were suffi cient for securing Breda for a long period of time.
Tacitean elements in Grotius's narrative
After this synopsis, it is time to ask ourselves whether we can characterize Grotius's account as Tacitean. Does Grotius give a lively and dramatic account of the surprise of Breda and more specifi cally, does he, like Tacitus, confi ne himself to what constitute according to him the essentials of the event, and does he focus in his account of these on the connections between the individual occurrences and their causes and eff ects as he sees them? In other words, does Grotius in the story of the capture of Breda distinguish himself from the chronological narrative in the works of the fi rst generation of history-books on the Dutch revolt like Van Meteren, Le Petit, Van Reyd and Bor, who were not familiar with the classical models and standards of historiography? And fi nally, does he convincingly present his own perspective on this psychologically crucial episode in the Dutch revolt? Th e following observations will suggest that -at least in the story of the surprise of Breda -he does not.
It is clear from the comparison with the sources that Grotius, when he wrote his fi rst version of 1612, did not present other information on the surprise of Breda than the books I consulted, 55 and it is very unlikely that he received additional inside information after his arrest in 1618 and his escape to France in 1621. 56 Grotius's account of the surprise is nothing but a repetition of the standard narrative of the capture based on a number of sources available to him. One may suppose that this was precisely what the States of Holland had asked him to do: to make available to an international audience (hence: in Latin) the historical facts which, until 1601 (when Grotius was commissioned to write the history of the Republic), people who did not know Dutch could only read in Le Petit or in the Latin or German version of Van Meteren.
Grotius's account simply follows the chronological sequence of the events from the preparations to the fall of the city, highlighting the planning of the act, the setbacks during its execution and fi nally its successful completion. So Grotius's chronicle of the facts is not manifestly diff erent from that of the other accounts and it therefore cannot strike the reader as a new kind of dramatic, in-depth historiography modelled after Tacitus. Nevertheless, the version Grotius off ers does deviate in some details from the other versions, and Grotius may seem to have made a deliberate eff ort to make his version concise by leaving out certain particulars which do fi gure in the story as it is given by others. Yet these deviations and omissions do not make Grotius's account really Tacitean, because they do not make his account dramatically eff ective, nor do they reveal that Grotius had his own view on what happened. On the contrary, the notes to the synopsis above have shown that Grotius's account is in some places unclear, misleading or even incomprehensible. Let us for the sake of argument review the most conspicuous defects we have noticed.
Defects in Grotius's story
In section 4, his account of what happened when the barge had passed the sluice makes no sense, because he says that thereafter (i.e. after having passed the sluice that separated the river from the moat, in which there was no change of tides) the barge sprang a leak and subsequently stopped making water because of the change of the tides in the river ('fl uminis recessu', line 28; 'aestu levata', line 30; see note 26). In section 5, the account of the rebellious mood among the soldiers and the numbness of some of them is incomplete and partly wrong (see note 31 and cf. 36). It also lacks its proper context, and, as we will see, Grotius's version of this dramatic episode in the story consequently lacks a certain dramatic tension which other chroniclers have succeeded in giving it (cf. p. 232). Next, Grotius is most probably wrong when he says that the terrifi ed, unarmed inhabitants of the city, when they heard the noise of the fi ghting, wanted to burst into the fortress to support the Italian garrison (see note 41), and he is so vague about the diff erent gates of the fortress and the palisade through which Hohenlohe and his horsemen entered, and then how 57 Maurice did not enter through the palisade on top of the earthen rampart, but through the 'veltpoort', which was by then defrosted; see above, note 45.
58 Th e barge was loaded with turf at Leur, the home village of the skippers (see above, p. 209 and p. 218, note 32).
59 Th e German pamphlet (Hallema (n. 2), p. 118 and 119), and Bor (n. 8), fol. 24 recto col. a, observe that the city was celebrating 'vastenavond', that is, the last three days before Lent or carnival. Th e pamphlet relates that when the citizens heard the shouting in the fort after Héraugière had begun the atttack, thought fi rst that 'die Soldaten Fasznacht hielten' and realized only later what was really going on (see also above, note 41). It is not clear to me why the other sources do not mention the celebration of carnival, while it played such a crucial role in the success of the attack (see above, note 43, and below, p. 231 with note 73). As for the setback of the Maurice entered the fortress, 57 that the reader cannot understand what happened unless he has the right information from elsewhere (see notes 42 and 46). Finally, it is remarkable that Grotius avoids telling that it was Hohenlohe who was responsible for the deceit with the money that had to be paid to avoid the pillaging of the city (see notes 50 and 52).
In what follows, I will discuss some further instances where Grotius leaves out material or deviates from his sources to the detriment of the quality of his narrative. In sections 1 and 2, Grotius gives some details on the history of Breda and in section 2, on turf (lines 14-18). So, Grotius seems to present his remarks on the nature of peat not as narrative elements in the dramatic story of the capture, but purely as background information for the foreign reader whom he assumes does not know turf and is unfamiliar with the fact that the Dutch use it for heating.
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A peculiar feature in Grotius's account is the fact that he does not mention any date or time, and that his chronological points of reference are scarce and very general ('diu', line 20; 'prima tempora', line 23; 'tandem', line 62). Th is omission of precise dates and times not only makes the narrative occasionally vague, but it also contributes to its lack of dramatic force. Lines 22-23 are a case in point: Grotius's sources mention that the soldiers were stuck for as many as two days and three nights on the cold ship before it was decided to disembark them for a while to recover. When we hear these fi gures, the men's plight on the ship and the inauspicious beginning of the expedition is immediately and forcefully brought home to the reader, but in Grotius's account this is totally obscured. Also, the omission of the date of the surprise, the night of Saturday March 3 to Sunday March 4, is remarkable, all the more because it was a stroke of luck for the attackers that the unforeseen delay during the trip from Zevenbergen to Breda caused them to arrive on their destination during the celebration of carnival, when everybody in the city was not as alert as they would have normally been. Grotius here fails to observe the obvious, namely that the initial setbacks turned out to be a blessing in disguise. 59 In some parts of the story, the narrative seems unnecessarily too laconic for a clear understanding of the course of events, unless one is already familiar with them. A case in point can be found in section 3, where the reader has diffi culty to understand how the men could have warmed and fed themselves ('ubi refoverant corpora', line 24), unless he knows that they disembarked to a warm place, only to reembark when he skipper announced that the wind was favorable for sailing. 60 Th ere are some passages where Grotius seems to deliberately leave out information either purely for the sake of conciseness, or in order to colour the story, perhaps for a political or other kind of reason. For example, following Van Reyd, 61 he simply mentions that a skipper ( nauta , line 9) came up with the idea of using a peatbarge to bring soldiers into Breda, leaving out some details mentioned by e.g. Bor: it was a group of bargemasters who proposed the plan to count Maurice in the summer of 1589. 62 According to some sources, it was Maurice himself and his half-brother Philip of Nassau who planned to use a stratagem, while other sources claim that the plan was developed simultaneously by these two and a group of skippers. 63 Perhaps for political reasons Grotius also leaves out the prominent role of the States of Holland and the Council of State and notably the Advocate of Holland Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, with whom Stadtholder Maurice was obliged to discuss the plan after his return to the seat of government Th e Hague, as stated explicitly by Van Meteren. It was Van Oldenbarnevelt who suggested Héraugière as the leader of the commando raid, and he was also present when Maurice discussed the execution of the plan with Héraugière and Adriaen van Bergen. 66 Likewise he leaves unmentioned that by surrendering to Maurice the city government did not place itself under the authority of Maurice, as Grotius has it in line 77, but in the fi rst place 'onder de gehoorsaemheyt vande Staten Generael' of the United Provinces, as Bor rightly states (n. 8), fol. 24 recto a. In lines 81-82 Grotius also suggests with 'attollit' that count Maurice could decide by himself about the appointment of Héraugière as governor of Breda and about the other promotions and rewards, while he naturally needed the consent of the States General, as most sources explicitly mention. Grotius apparently wants to portray count Maurice before the foreign reader as a kind of sovereign, instead of the army leader and Stadtholder of, at that moment, four of the seven provinces he was. Cf. also above, p. 224 with note 54.
So Grotius attributes the planning of the operation entirely to Maurice. 65 Grotius also mentions only one of the offi cers Héraugière took with him, Lambert Charles, perhaps because only this offi cer plays a major role in Grotius's version of the story.
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Sections 4, 5, 6 and the beginning of 7 constitute the climax of the story, extending over less than 12 hours and including four phases: (1) the arrival of the barge within the limits of the fortress on Saturday, March 3, around 2 p.m., (2) the period until ca. midnight, when the soldiers were trapped in their hiding place, still in the bilgewater, while the risk of being discovered was constantly present, (3) the emerging from the barge around midnight and the ensuing fi ght with the garrison of the castle, and fi nally (4) the arrival of Hohenlohe about two hours after the end of the fi ghting, and later count Maurice himself with his army. In these sections, Grotius seems to have made an eff ort to relate as many facts and details as possible and be short and concise at the same time, by a terse sentence structure on the one hand and by leaving out some details on the other hand. However, as it is clear from the notes in the summary of these sections, the result was that his story contains inaccuracies (e.g. the sluice 67 Th e sentence 'Nec silendum … rumores' (lines 23-24) has been added in the margin of the manuscript, but does in my view not date from the period after 1612. I take it that, just as lines 78-81, this sentence was part of the 1612 version; see note 51 above. Th e rumors in question are not mentioned in the sources I consulted. 68 Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), pp. 68-69, with note 1, mentions that it has been suggested that the city had been warned of an assault by Maurice, but states that this obviously has not been the case.
69 Th e 'porticus', which did indeed exist and was situated on both sides of the gate to the city, is not mentioned in the sources I consulted.
in line 27; see notes 26 and 30; the piercing of the barge by ice, see note 27) and lacks clarity in many points (e.g. the confusion about the gates of the fortress in lines 49, 61, 64, 66; see note 42), so that his account, far from being pointedly Tacitean, is diffi cult to understand to the point of being unintelligible.
In the above we have discussed some passages in which details have been left out to the detriment of the readability of the story. Th ere are also passages in which Grotius inserts details which have no function in his narrative and which only confuse the reader. A good case in point occurs in section 3, where Grotius interrupts his story with the observation, for the sake of completeness ('nec silendum reor', line 23), that rumors claiming that the surprise had succeeded came from England at a time when the peatbarge had not yet even reached Breda. 67 Here, the problem is that the reader is not made to understand from the context why this isolated piece of information is relevant to the event he is reading about. 68 Similarly, the 'proxima porticus' (the adjacent colonnade, line 62) from which Héraugière's soldiers fi red at the assailants, and the 'porta' mentioned in line 64 leave the reader puzzled (see note 45). It is unclear from the context what kind of thing the 'proxima porticus' is, and the reader wonders whether or not the 'porta' of line 64 is one of the 'portae' (plural) of 61.
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Grotius adds other isolated details to the sources I consulted, which arouse needless questions in the reader's mind and divert his attention from the essentials rather than lend depth to the story, e.g. the mentioning of the young Italian who was spared by Parma, while it remains unclear how many were hanged as punishment for their running away (see note 49). Such a detail is also the quasi-learned side-remark in line 86, whether the Trojan horse was really a horse or rather a ship. It is remarkable that Le Petit (as in n. 5, p. 580 col. b) also refers to this discussion, with a reference to the fact that the name of the peatbarge was 'l'Espérance', but then it was not Le Petit's aim to achieve Tacitean brevity and confi nement to the essentials, but to present a detailed and accurate account of events that had taken place only fi fteen years earlier. 70 See notes 43 (on carnival) and 59 (on carnival and the pumping) and see on the pumping also notes 37 and 73, and p. 232 with note 74.
Missed chances
All in all, Grotius's account off ers a rather fl at sequence of partially unconnected events. In particular, Grotius does not seem to have succeeded in appropriately conveying the risks of the surprise attack or the bravery and endurance of the men who carried it out, nor has he suffi ciently highlighted noteworthy facts which might have helped to stimulate the reader's attention. A close look at Grotius's way of presenting the occurrences related in section 3 through 5 can further illustrate this.
At the beginning of section 3, Grotius stresses in a sententia that great eff orts are often burdened with evil: 'ut solent ejusmodi conatus malis onerari' (line 21). Th e truth of the sententia is proved by two incidents: the adverse wind which caused some delay ('prima tempora abstulere', section 3, lines 22-23) and the leak in the barge (section 4, lines 28-29). Grotius fails to observe, however, that these two strokes of bad luck actually worked out very favorably when the barge fi nally reached its destination: due to the delay the barge arrived in Breda during the period of carnival, when the vigilance of soldiers and civilians had slackened, while the leak made it necessary to pump out bilgewater, and thus helped to suppress the inevitable noises made by so many men cramped up for so long in their dark hiding-place. 70 Moreover, Grotius might have mentioned in the immediate context of his sententia that the expedition was handicapped by another 'malum' when it had passed the last boom, from which point it was impossible to turn back, namely the necessity to wait for about one hour for the sluice to open because it was low tide (see notes 27 and 30). During this time the men were not only trapped but their situation became also extremely diffi cult because the barge started to make water and the men, locked up in the hold, had to face the danger of death by drowning (see note 31). Instead of highlighting this ordeal of the soldiers, Grotius is rather minimizing about their justifi ed fear (line 29: 'trepidare …latebras') and moves the protests which had been expressed earlier, when some men had lost heart and complained about their leader, to an impossibly late moment, when the barge was already within the limits of the fortress (see note 31). Moreover, Grotius seems to aggravate the soldiers' complaints which the sources mention, as related in note 31, to full-fl edged insubordination ('poscere', line 41). For at least I did not fi nd what he says in lines 40-41 ('tenebras … traherentur') in the sources I consulted: if they, the soldiers, 71 See above, note 22. Th e only other way out was to make a passage in the wooden partition towards the side of the cabin (see above, note 22), but this was impossible by the fast rising bilgewater. Most sources mention the 'querelae in Heraugerium' (line 39) during the waiting period before the sluice on Saturday, but prior to the incident of the leak (see above, note 31). Only Van Meteren states that the complaints resulted from the long waiting period in enemy territory from Monday evening until Th ursday morning. Hence, Van Meteren places Héraugière's reaction on Th ursday in the fortress Noortdam; see for this also above, note 36. 72 Cf. above, note 50, where we have seen that Grotius blames the soldiers for something they were not really responsible for. 73 For the carnival see above, notes 59 and 70. Van der Hoeven, Geschiedenis der vesting Breda (as in n. 16), p. 69, says that the workmen were civilians. According to Wijnbeek, Het turfschip van Breda (as in n. 17), p. 41, they were soldiers (as only in the Latin version of Van Meteren (n. 6), p. 515 (erroneously 516): 'milites exportantes') under the command of a sergeant; however, it does not seem likely that the skipper could have given leave to soldiers from the fortress to go to the city, or could have enticed their superior to do so. Grotius avoids the question.
were doomed to die, they demanded to get into the open and attack the enemy instead of being overpowered in their hiding and be executed. Grotius did apparently not realize that it was impossible to leave the barge before at least one hatch of the deck would have been made free. 71 To make things worse, Grotius puts the recalcitrance and protests of some soldiers in section 5 down to their dread of the approaching danger ('admotum propius periculum formidinem expresserat et in Herauge rium querelas', lines 38-39), and thus actually turns the brave soldiers into cowards.
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Grotius's account lacks precise references of time, and hence he does not give a good indication of the ordeal which the soldiers underwent courageously, namely that, after the barge had passed the sluice around 3 p.m. (see note 30), they were still trapped for a full eight or nine hours (see note 35) in their dark hiding-place, with their feet in ice-cold water, surrounded by the continuous noise of the pump, while the danger of the situation was heightened by the fact that people might come aboard, thus increasing the risk of the soldiers being discovered. When workmen were ordered to unload enough turf to supply all the (open) guardhouses without delay, the skipper shrewdly succeeded in stopping them in time to avert the discovery of the soldiers, by giving the workmen drinking money to celebrate carnival in the city. 73 Grotius briefl y mentions the unloading of the barge and the bold intervention of the skipper in one sentence at the beginning of the section in which he relates the disembarkment of the men at midnight and the ensuing fi ght with the enemy (section 6, lines 44-45), where the reader cannot grasp the dramatic force of the event.
In Van Reyd's brief account, there is another incident proving that the skipper was a true hero, which Grotius leaves out altogether. Immediately after the 74 For Helt, see n. 29 and cf. n. 59. Van Reyd (n. 7), p. 288, adds an eulogy of the young skipper who in the midst of the very dangerous situation 'noyt veranderde van gelaet / varwe noch spraeck', always remained cool-headed and able to give a pertinent reply to every question (cf. above, note 33). Only Bor (n. 8), fol. 23 recto col. a, also mentions the pumping at this point of the story. In spite of its decisive part in the success of the operation, the pumping of bilgewater to drown the noise made by the soldiers is in Grotius's account only mentioned (in two words !) later, in section 6, when the soldiers are coming out of their hiding place (line 48).
skipper had succeeded in sending away the workmen, his nerves were put to the test again, when a servant of the acting commander of the fortress came to complain about the quality of the turf. Th e skipper bravely dismissed him too, by assuring him that the best turf was below deck, and was kept there specially for the captain: he will get it tomorrow ('den besten light onder / dien heb ic voor den Capiteyn verordent', Van Reyd, p. 288; not in the other sources). Th is dramatic scene full of tension enlivens the story and, with the skipper's bitter sarcasm in defi ance of the enemy, is worthy of a Tacitean historian, but we fi nd it in Van Reyd, not in Grotius. And Van Reyd relates at this point yet another proof of the skipper's bravery in the dangerous situation while the workmen were coming on board. When Mathijs Helt, numb with cold, was overcome by continuous coughing and asked to be killed so as not to give away their hiding place, the skipper started pumping bilge water vehemently to drown the noise of his coughing. 74 Th is detail is left unmentioned by Grotius, and he thus misses another chance to make his narrative suitably dramatic.
As explained in note 36, Grotius mentions three addresses by Héraugière to the soldiers, in lines 24-25, line 42 and in section 6, lines 46-47, immediately before the disembarkment and the actual attack: 'milites admonitos prius ad decus et praemia victoriae, desertoribus vero animosi facinoris non vitam, ne mortem quidem honestam dari' (the soldiers will achieve glory and spoils if they win; but those who would run away from the fi ght would not only lose their lives, but would not even be granted an honorable death). Grotius pays particular attention to this last speech, which, as we see, he summarizes in the oratio obliqua . However, especially the wording of the clear-cut warning at the end resembles the only speech of which there exists a more detailed account, reported by the French pamphlet (Hallema, p. 124), repeated with small diff erences by Le Petit (p. 579b -580a) and with embellishments by Bor (fol. 22 verso col b -23 recto col. a). It is, as explained in note 31, the speech in reaction to the complaints made by some soldiers much earlier and which, as is stated at the end, drove them to risk everything for the operation. Th is last detail also shows that the complaints and the speech took place at a moment when the soldiers still had the (theoretical) 75 Bor (n. 8) embellishes the expression of Héraugière's ethos: "… hy was ghesint zijn leven ten dienste van zijn Excellentie ende 't Vaderlant / vromelick te waghen / hy wilde liever sterven dan faelgeren in zijn devoir / de victorie was hen seecker / so sy maer coragie hadden / hy soude hen in alles voorgaen ende een goet leytsman wesen / …' (fol. 22 verso col. b -23 recto col. a). Bor has Héraugière here call the Republic of the rebellious provinces his fatherland, but he was native of Cambray, and most of the soldiers he addressed were not born in the territory of the Republic: they were, after all, mercenaries. Both editions of Van Meteren (n. 6), in a brief summary of this speech, also report that Héraugière used his ethos: p. 515 (erroneously 516) 'sese exemplo statuens', resp. fol. 271 verso col. a '(met) sijn exempel', after which the soldiers 'verwillichden alles met hem te wagen'.
choice to refuse to continue, that is, before the passing of the last boom in the river, the point of no return (cf. p. 231 with note 71).
As Hallema, p. 108, convincingly argues, the French pamphlet originates from the circle around Héraugière himself. Th is also explains how the content and wording of the speech could be handed down, albeit possibly embellished by himself after the event. Now what did Grotius do with this material? Instead of putting in the mouth of the leader a short instigation and encouragement of the soldiers on the decisive moment immediately before the attack, he summarizes here in line 47 an at that moment inapproptiate part of the speech (see above, note 36), leaving out the most important part, namely how Héraugière stressed his own ethos: he would rather die, he said, than fail in his duty towards His Excellency. 75 Here again, Grotius missed the chance to show that Héraugière was a true hero. Instead, he once more belittles the soldiers by having them threatened with death at the moment when their leader is dependent not on their fear, but on their loyalty, their dedication and courage.
Conclusion
We may conclude that, on the whole, Grotius seems to have aimed at following more or less closely his sources. He scarcely presents facts that are not found in the most obvious sources, and he roughly follows the chronological sequence of the events. Nevertheless, we have seen that, in his pursuit of brevitas , he on the one hand leaves out or distorts indispensible elements of the story (e.g. the omission of the boom and the constant pumping of bilgewater, and in section 6 the 'escape' of one of the skippers to warn Maurice (note 43)), and on the other hand includes details which have no function in the abridged story as he tells it, or which are even not understandable by lack of proper explanation (e.g. the rumors from England in line 23; the mentioning of a 'porticus' (line 62) from which Héraugière's men fi red at the bridge). Th e result of these shortcomings is that, in spite of the chronological 76 It is true that all sources, except the German pamphlet (n. 2) and Van Reyd (n. 7) who do not mention the fl ight of the garrison, follow the order of things from the viewpoint of the Dutch troops and thus mention the fl ight only after having reported the arrival of Maurice in the fortress, who then did not yet know that the Italians had already fl ed (cf. above, note 46). But this is hardly an excuse for a history-writer of the second generation who presents himself as a Tacitean historian, to not even allude to the decisive impact of this unforseen event and to completely omit any analysis of the risks and the eventual success of the raid.
lay-out of the account, the reader cannot fully comprehend the action described by Grotius.
In his summary of the events related by his predecessors Grotius hardly pays attention, if at all, to the mutual connection between the occurrences he recounts. Only in very rare cases does he indicate a connection between cause and eff ect, and even then not explicitly: when Hohenlohe has entered the fortress, Lanzavechia negotiates his surrender with preservation of his life ('incolumitatem pacisci', line 65). But Grotius did not draw any conclusion from this fact, because he nowhere even makes an attempt to present a refl ective analysis of the course of events. For what did the expedition in fact make a success? What were the decisive moments?
In military terms, there were two: fi rstly, the unforeseen fl ight of the city garrison after the noise of the fi ghting had reached the city; secondly, the quick arrival of Hohenlohe and Maurice before the fl ight of the city garrison could be discovered by the enemy and counteraction could be taken. Grotius however mentions the fl ight of the city garrison unchronologically after the end of the fi ghting in the fortress (lines 67-71), presenting it only as the reason why the city government could do nothing but buy off the plundering of the city, whereas in fact it was the main reason for the success of the entire operation and whereas the strength of the Italian garrison, which Grotius initially did not even mention (see note 48), shows how risky the adventure with the peatbarge was. 76 Grotius did not understand that, if the city garrison, which counted no less than 600 men, would have attacked the 70 raiders in the fort, Héraugière would have had little chance to prevail when at the same time Lanzavechia would have made another sortie against him. It is for this reason that Lanzavechia, who could not know that the city garrison had fl ed, surrenders only after Hohenlohe has come to reinforce Héraugière. In Grotius's version of the events, this causal connection is completely obscured as if on purpose.
Th e second fact that was decisive for the outcome of the surpise-attack is that by lucky coincidence, Hohenlohe could be alerted early (through Maurice) and because of this could be present as early as two hours after the fi ghting in the fortress was over. Grotius, however, ignores this completely and mentions the fact perfunctorily at the wrong place and in only four words (lines [62] [63] . He also did not ask himself how the message was brought to Hohenlohe and how much time it took it to reach him and thus Grotius leaves the reader puzzled as to what kind of 'sign' Hohenlohe received. See notes 32 and 43-44.
Th e decisive role that chance played in the successful outcome of the operation remains completely underexposed in Grotius's narrative 77 (see p. 227 with note 59 and p. 231 with note 70), because he does not present any view on what happened, nor does he off er any critical analysis of the course of events. Th e only remark that goes some way towards the formulation of a view is found in lines 56-57, where he calls the double-command of Odoardo Lanzavechia over Breda and Geertruidenberg a serious mistake of Parma. 78 However, this fact in itself did not have infl uence on the course of the fi ght; here too, the most important factor is missing in Grotius (see note 40). For in his own version, Lanzavechia's son Paolo emerges as a brave acting commander of the fortress. Th e only mistake on the Italian side did not come from Parma, but from Odoardo, namely the fact that when he left for Geertruidenberg, he did not station more troops in the fortress. But, as shown above, even this fact was not the most decisive.
Finally, except for the very fi rst sentence of book 2 (Appendix, line 1), Grotius does not devote a single word to the eff ect the capture of Breda has had in the context of the war. He only mentions as an isolated piece of information that the States General instituted a thanksgiving-day and issued a commemorative medal for this 'fi rst victory of the commander (Maurice)' (lines 82-83). However, he does not mention that Breda, after the series of recaptures by Parma (e.g. Ghent, Bruges and Antwerp in 1584-1585), was also the very fi rst victory of the Republic and that it now proceeded to waging a successful off ensive war. In this process, it used the fact that Philip II had decided at that moment to concentrate his troops for an intervention campaign on the side of the Roman Catholic Ligue in the French civil war. Th us, the psychological importance of the capture of Breda for not only the position of Maurice, but above all for the Republic as a whole, can hardly be underestimated, but Grotius does not mention it with a single word. 77 He mentions it only once: 'forte' in line 33. 78 In the manuscript, Grotius has added the sentence on Parma's error (lines 56-57) after 1612, simultaneously with the related remark in line 54 that Odoardo's son was 'juvenis et belli artium rudis' (cf. also n. 49). Both remarks are not taken from the the sources I consulted. In sum, Grotius's account of this eventful and dramatic turning point in the war of the young Dutch Republic against Spain is nothing but a rather fl at narrative, which attempts in a rather artifi cial way to imitate Tacitus's brevitas on the stylistic level.
Language and style
So in our search for the Tacitean historian in Grotius's account of the capture of Breda, we are left with Grotius's language and style. Th e special idiom of Tacitus was in the time of Grotius -as it still is today -famous for a number of features: in general its brevitas and conciseness, furthermore frequent and sharp contrasts between words and parts of sentences, designed irregularity and impredictable running and content of sentences, a number of syntactical peculiarities, poetic and archaic diction, and fi nally the frequent use of sententiae . None of these characteristiscs is exclusively Tacitean, but their appearing together and with some frequency can lend a Tacitean fl avour to a text.
Grotius's language and style have such a Tacitean fl avour. A large collection of samples of Tacitean usages in his Annales et Historiae has been presented by Boot in an article dating from 1883.
79 Following Boot's method, that is, using the still unsurpassed nineteenth-century analyses of Tacitus's style as point of reference, 80 I will give some examples from the account of the capture of Breda illustrating that Grotius aimed for Tacitean brevity, variety and irregularity, and I will give a survey of the Tacitean idiosyncrasies of language and style which Grotius has adopted. It is likely that Grotius read Tacitus in the edition of Lipsius, to which he wrote himself some notes and emendations, but the diff erences between the old and the modern text of Tacitus do not aff ect the reader's general impression of Tacitus's language and style. 81 Nevertheless, any future thorough and detailed study of Grotius's grammar and style should take Tacitus's seventeenth-century text as Grotius knew it as its starting point. Grotius writes overall short, grammatically correct sentences, consisting of a main clause with one or two subordinate clauses or an equivalent thereof (e.g. a participle or an adverbial adjunct), in some cases supplemented with one or more ablative absolutes.
In Grotius's syntax and style we fi nd various Tacitean features that contribute to brevity. 82 Th us, Grotius's sustained eff ort to say as much as possible in as few words as he can is shown in four cases of parenthetical sentences; the parenthetical word or expression, or a complete parenthetical sentence is one of Tacitus's much used means to achieve brevity: Other stylistic devices used by Tacitus to achieve brevity are ellipses and similar abbreviated expressions, the frequent use of participle constructions, zeugma and other constructions. Here are some examples of each of these devices in our text:
-Th ere are a number of ellipsis of the auxiliary 'est' or 'era(n)t', in lines 13:
' Tacitus's style is not only characterized by brevity, but also by variety and irregularity. 83 Grotius does not seem to have used these stylistic devices frequently, but the following examples show that they are not lacking completely:
-in lines 2-3 the subject 'oppidum' has two attributes, one adverbial expression ('fertili circum agro') and one present participle ('imperitans'). -Th ere are several cases of asymmetrical construction. Grotius alternates 'pars' with 'plures' in lines 39, 42, and 'pars' with 'manus altera' in lines 49, 52. In lines 63-64 the singular 'pars exercitus' is followed by a relative 'qui' in the plural. In lines 87-88, we have a relative clause alternating with propositional complement in an ablative absolute: 'Relictis centuriis quae tuerentur et turmis ad incursandos Brabantorum pagos.'
On top of the devices for brevity and variety, we fi nd in our text a number of syntactical and stylistic characteristics which are known as typical of Tacitus's idiom:
Th ere are also a few cases of meanings and constructions which seem unclassical. We may perhaps safely assume that such cases are examples of Grotius deliberately deviating from the classical idiom to strengthen the Tacitean fl avor of his text.
-In line 40 he uses the unclassical and slightly akward phrase 'pars (militum) … non tenebras morari … poscere' (some soldiers demanded that they should no longer be detained in the dark). -In line 69, he unexpectedly writes 'portas aversas ab hoste tenere' instead of 'hostes a portis tenere'. -In line 77 he uses the collocation 'paternos penates' to express the notion that Breda is count Maurice's hereditary city. Th is collocation is very rareit only occurs in Tacitus, Histories 3.86.3 and in pseudo-Quintilian's Major Declamation 5.8, where it means 'his father's house' -and it may be intended by Grotius as an intertextual reference to Tacitus.
General conclusion
To sum up: is Grotius's narrative of the capture of Breda a masterful piece of Tacitean writing? It is clear from our observations in the section 'Language and style', that, as Boot already showed for the entire Annales et Historiae , Grotius made a conscious and successful eff ort to imitate the language and style of Tacitus. However, when we turn to the structure of the narrative, we fi nd that little or nothing resembles Tacitus's historiography. On the whole, Grotius simply follows the chronological sequence of the events and therefore, surprisingly, does not distinguish himself in essence from the Breda-story in the well-known and in Grotius's days widely read historybooks written in a vernacular (Le Petit, Van Meteren, Van Reyd, Bor). In many cases, Grotius does not notice the coherence of the narrated events or he even breaks it up. Th us, for instance, he does not observe that it was owing to the barge making water that the men were not discovered during the waiting period of 8 or 9 hours, because it made it necessary to pump bilge water during that entire period (see notes 37 and 59). Hence, the pumping mentioned in line 48 is an isolated fact in his narrative, just like the rumors mentioned in line 23-24 (see p. 229, with notes 67 and 68). When he mentions the connection between the absence of Parma's city commander and the success of the surprise attack, Grotius fails to mention the main reason for it, namely the weakness of the garrison in the fortress: see note 40 and p. 235. And to cite a fi nal example, he presents the delay at the beginning of the trip in section 3 as an isolated fact, which he fails to bring into connection with the fact that the guards of the fortress, apparently deprived of turf for several days, were keeping themselves warm in their guardhouse and therefore could be killed 'intra stationem' (line 50).
Furthermore, we have found that his version of the surprise-attack diff ers, to its detriment, in certain places from other reports: some facts have been left out although they are necessary to understand the sequence of events, while others are included which have no function in the story line. Moreover, Grotius does not at all succeed to grip his readers; he does not to the full extent represent the trials and dangers to which the soldiers in the barge were exposed, nor the perseverance and bravery necessary to face them successfully. Grotius's version of the surprise of Breda contains nothing for the reader to remember it by, except the feeling that there is a clear incongruity between style and content.
In pp. 236-240, I have analyzed the language and style of Grotius's story as if this could be an object of study in its own right. However, it is my conviction that this approach -which is also that of Boot, Draeger and Furneaux -is in fact at variance with the nature of the object as it is, namely a text which passes on to the reader knowledge of a series of facts and, in the way it presents those facts, simultaneously transmits a certain view of them. Th is 'content' of the text just cannot be separated from its 'form'. I therefore completely agree with Norma Miller, who wrote about Tacitus that it is not only impossible to 'divorce the man from the historian', but also that such a divorce would make us fail to notice that 'the content may have been subtly aff ected by the form in which it is cast, 88 because, as she stresses, 'the historian is, by defi nition, not only a recorder, but an interpreter', 89 by the mere fact that he relates the historic events in his own manner. Th is fact also applies to Grotius, however much he seems to have tried to present an 'objective' account of the events.
I also fully agree with Norma Miller that 'Tacitus fi ts his style to its content' and that the stylistic devices he uses are 'always connected with the content which is being presented' (pp. 111-112). If we judge Grotius by these standards, then we cannot but fi nd that the Tacitean characteristics listed above in his case never serve to give the occurrence he is relating a certain 'color' or liveliness: his account of the capture of Breda remains a sequence of dry and unconnected occurrences. Nowhere does an unusual or striking linguistic usage cause excitement, nowhere does a case of irregular syntax express a quick succession of events or a causal chain of actions, nowhere does an interruption of the course of events serve to insert a circumstance which had an eff ect on what happened, nowhere does the style express the complex of confl icting motives of the diff erent parties involved or tendencies which cross each other as, for instance, on the one hand the eagerness with which the Italian soldiers, who were bitterly cold because of the forced delay of the barge at the beginning of the journey, hauled it into the fortress and hastily tried to get their hands on the fuel for their braziers, and on the other hand the fact that their impatience increased the risk for the attackers to be discovered, because they were with their feet in the bilgewater and could hardly suppress their coughing. Even the parentheses nowhere serve, for instance, the depiction of the interaction of simultaneous events, or the introduction into the story of diff erent interpretations of motives, each of which convey a diff erent view of the course of the entire enterprise, such as the fact that the fl ight of the city garrison on the one hand brought about the success of the surprise attack, while on the other hand it shows that the operation was almost doomed to fail without a great deal of good fortune. Grotius's imitation of the language and style of Tacitus in fact only accentuates how little Tacitean his account of the capture of Breda actually is.
All in all, the judgement of Boot, that Grotius wrote for the mature and careful Latinist, who will understand what the author means, if need be after reading a passage two or three times, 90 does not hold good for the account of the surprise of Breda. Th e attentive reader of that account is rather tempted to agree with Grotius's contemporary Hieronymus Bignonius, who, after having read the entire Annales et Historiae in manuscript, did not approve of its brevitas because it is 'obscuritati obnoxia' (resulting in obscurity). 91 Indeed, judging by the surprise of Breda, the imitation of Tacitus's language and style has driven Grotius to produce a narrative that goes all but completely without the qualities for which Tacitus's Annals and Histories are famous: it not only lacks factual coherence, but it also fails to give a good impression of the dramatic occurrences which took place in Breda, and on their causes and eff ects, and it leaves totally unexpressed any judgement or view of the author on how that important success in the history of the Dutch revolt was achieved.
